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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KIM L. NORRIS, LEX R.
NORRIS, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 15,718

-vsA. M. ANDERSON and NORA S.
ANDERSON, husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to compel specific performance of an
agreement to sell certain real property and to collect a
real estate commission for the real estate agency handling
the transaction.
DISPOSITION IN A LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Court on February 1,
1978, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, sitting without
a jury, and on February 14, 1978, the Court filed its decision,
dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff, no cause of
action.

(R. 34-36).

The Decree and Judgment reflecting the

decision of the Court was signed by the Court on February
24, 1978.

(R. 15-16).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment of the trial
court and an Order of this Court compelling specific performance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and awarding a real estate commission, including attorneys
fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this action, Kim L. Norris, Lex R.
Norris, and Lanny T. Norris are all brothers and are partners
doing business as LKL Associates.

Taylor National Real

Estate, the other plaintiff, is a real estate agency located
in Orem, Utah.

The defendants, A. M. Anderson and Nora s.

Anderson, are also residents of Orem, Utah, and are the
owners of a certain parcel of real property which is the
subject matter of the dispute.
In September of 1976, the defendants listed their
property through Boley ·Realty on the Utah County Multiple
Listing Service,

(P. Exhibit 1), agreeing to pay a 6%

commission in accordance with the terms of the listing.

On

January 7, 1977, the plaintiffs, LKL Associates, through
their agent, Bryce K. Taylor, of Taylor National Real Estate,
submitted an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase to
the Andersons which constituted an offer to purchase the
subject property for $250,000.00.

(P. Exhibit 2).

The

Offer to Purchase was given to the ll.ndersons at their home by
Mr. Taylor through Mr. Dean Hall, of Boley Realty.

At the

time the offer was presented, it contained only the information through line 57. (T. 12, 26).

After receiving the offer,

Hall and the Andersons upon the encouragement of Mr. Hall
went to see Mr. Boley about making a counter-offer.

(T.
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and Boley, a counter-offer of seven points was drawn up upon
the stationery of Boley Realty.

That document is attached

to plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 as page 2.

(T. 13).

The document

was dated January 11, 1977 and signed by Mr. and Mrs. Anderson.
(T. 14).

At the same time, the Andersons put an "X" through

certain portions on the face of the original Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

Mr. Anderson stated that the

counter-off er took the place of the portion that had been
crossed out, but that he agreed with all of the other terms
of the original offer.

(T. 14-15).

Also on January 11,

1977, additional hand written terms to the counter-offer
were added to the face of the original Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase which statement was also subscribed by
the Andersons.

That statement is really the key to this

litigation and states as follows:
"Seller agrees to the terms above
stated with the incorporation of the
seven points outlined on the attached
amendment sheet. Subject to buyers
acceptance within five days.
Dated January 11 - 1977
A. M. Anderson
Nora s. Anderson"

(P. Exhibit 2).

Mr. Bryce Taylor was present in the home of the Andersons
when the counter-offers were signed and dated, and the
documents were given to Mr. Taylor on January 11 to convey
to the Norrises.

(T. 29).

Mr. Taylor was unable to convey

the counter-offer to the Norrises until January 12.

:::..-'

Finally,

on January 14, 1977, the plaintiffs, through Kim Norris,
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acceptance on the bottom of the second page of Bxhibit 2.
That acceptance stated as follows:
"Buyer agrees to counter-offer
subject to d~__<2..!_2Q_'__~<!9~m~nt
ana subject to seller's acceptance
of second mortgage provision contained
in original offer.
Kirn L. Norris
Jan. 14, 1977"
(P. Exhibit 2).
Taylor then called Hall and told Hall that he had a
conditional acceptance of the counter-offer of the Andersons
and that the parties needed to get another meeting together
with the Andersons.

Taylor, Hall and the Andersons met on

the afternoon of Saturday, January 15, 1977.
31).

(T. 16-17, 30-

The Andersons at the time were hurrying to a church

meeting but the individuals did have a short meeting in
which Anderson indicated that he was not anxious to delete
the two items from his counter-offer but that, he would have
to consider the matter.

(T. 122).

Taylor recalled that

the parties had agreed to communicate again on Monday, the
17th of January, concerning the transaction, (T. 34), but
Mr. Anderson stated that there was nothing definite said
about any meeting on the 17th.

(T. 17).

In any event, the

spirit of the meeting on Saturday, the 15th of January was
that there may be some possibility of compromise and solving
the differences between the parties.

(T. 32-34).

On the morning of January~~l977, Dean Hall called
Mr. Taylor and informed him that Anderson had decided to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stick with the original seven points rather than to compromise
as had been discussed on Saturday.

(T. 122).

Anderson denied that he told Hall on the morning of the

~-----------------.--- -----------=------

17th that he would have to stand by the original counter-

offer but instead testified that his communication with Hall
on the morning of the 17th was to the effect that the counteroffer had expired and that the deal would be off.
20).

(T. 19-

However, Mr. Hall testified that when he called Anderson

on the morning of the 17th to see how he felt about the two
provisions, that the only thing Anderson said, was, "that in
no way did he want to relinquish on either point".
122).

(T.

Immediately thereafter, Hall called Taylor and told

him what Anderson had said.

(T. 123).

On the morning of January 18, 1977, Mr. Taylor called
Mr. Hall and told Hall that the Norrises had accepted the
Andersons' counteroffer as originally written, including all
seven points.

(T. 35-36, 123-124).

That telephone call by

Taylor to Hall was initiated after Lanny L. Norris had
written on the bottom of page two of Exhibit 2, the following
words:
"The buyer accepts counter-offer as written.
Lanny L. Norris
January 18, 1977.
(P. Exhibit 2).
At the same time, Mr. Norris crossed out that portion
of page 2 which had previously been written by Mr. Rim
Sponsored
by the on
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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Upon communicating to Hall that the Norris' had accepted
the offer as written, Mr. Taylor requested that Hall and
Taylor again meet with the Andersons to get their initials
on the counter-offer.

Hall told Taylor that Hall would call

the Andersons and arrange the meeting.

Hall called about 30

minutes later and told Taylor that Anderson was engaged the
night of January 18, and would not be able to meet but that
they could go to Anderson's place on the morning of January
19.

(T36).

The following morning, Taylor and Hall went to the
Anderson home with Mr. Hall ariving some time prior to
Taylor.

As soon as Taylor arrived, he was told by Hall that

Hall was presenting another offer from Mr. Boley to the
Andersons and that the Andersons were considering that offer
at that point.

Some time thereafter, Mr. Paul Taylor, father

of Bryce Taylor, also arrived at the Anderson home.

(T. 37).

Taylor had exhibit 2 with him at the meeting on top of his
file or in his opened file which was on top of his briefcase.
(T. 48).

The meeting terminated when Mr. Anderson indicated

that he was not accepting anyone's offer and refused further
negotiations.

Later, on the afternoon of the 19th, Kim and

Lanny Norris visited with Anderson at which time Anderson told
them that if they had accepted within five days, "they would
have bought the place."

(T. 24).

Mr. Bryce Taylor subsequently sent a completed copy of
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase including
page 2 as signed and modified by all of the parties to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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the Andersons that was received by Mr. Anderson on February
17, 1977.
After trial of the matter, the court found that the
offer originally submitted by the Norris brothers was rejected
by the Andersons on January 11, 1977 at which time a counteroffer was made "subject to buyers acceptance within five
days".

The court also found that the "conditional acceptancen

of the plaintiffs of January 14, was discussed by the parties,
both through the real estate agents and at the meeting of
January-15, between the Andersons, Hall and Taylor.

The

court found that there was no acceptance of the counteroffer at that meeting althrough there was some discussion
that a solution to the problem of the right-of-way and the
second mortgage provision may be had but that the Andersons
wished to consider those matters further.

There was also a

finding that on the 17th of January, the Andersons advised
Hall that they could not delete the two conditions and that
the counter-offer as submitted was all the Andersons would
accept.
The Court held that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§68-3-8, the 16th of January being a Sunday was not counted
so that the plaintiffs had through the 17th of January to
accept the counteroffer of the defendants.

There was a

further finding that the "conditional acceptance" of the
plaintiffs contained in the four lines which were crossed
out on the second page of Exhibit 2 amounted to a rejection
of the counter-offer, which could not, by a subsequent act

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the rejecting offeree, be accepted in the original form
of the counter-offer.

The Court made no specific findings

or comments as to the second cause of action of the plaintiffs'
complaint concerning the real estate commission but the
Court dismissed both the first and second cause of action of
the plaintiffs' complaint.

(R. 34-36, 17-20).

It is the plaintiffs' contention that the trial court
erred in failing to compel specific performance by the
defendants and erred in failing to award a commission to
the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate Company.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.
The trial court based its decision to dismiss the first
cause of action of plaintiffs' complaint, upon three premises:
(1) That the plaintiffs did not accept defendants'
counter-offer within the time period required by the terms of
the counter-offer;
(2) That the conditional acceptance of the plaintiffs
was in reality a rejection of the counter-offer and a new
offer and therefore, the original offer could not be subsequent~
accepted, and
(3) That there was no conduct on the part of defendants
to either extend the five day period or that constituted a
waiver of that lmiitation.

(R. 17-20, 34-36).

The plaintiffs claim there was timely acceptance by
them and that the Court should have compelled specific

-8-
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performance.
Because of the various transactions between the parties,
it is difficult to put a rigorous legal label upon each of the
transactions so that it becomes a "offer", "counter-offer",
etc.

Plaintiffs submit, however, that the only logical

interpretation of the actions of the parties is that there
was an original offer submitted by the plaintiffs on January
7, 1977, which was rejected by the counter-offer of the
defendants dated January 11, 1977.

There was a conditional

acceptance of the counter-offer on January 14, 1977, which
conditional acceptance was, in fact, a counter-offer to the
counter-offer.

The defendants rejected the counter-offer or

conditional acceptance by reaffirming or reinstating their
original counter-offer.

That reinstatement happened on

January 17, 1977 and that reinstatement became a third
counter-offer which was ultimately accepted on January 18,
1977.

This characterization of the activities of the parties

is supported by the general rules found at 17 Am Jur 2d,
378, Contracts, §39;
An offer is rejected by a counteroffer, and in this respect a qualified
or conditional acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer.
And, 17 Am. Jur. 2d 401 Contracts,

§62:

"If a condition is affixed to the
acceptance by the party to whom the
offer is made, or any modification of
or change in the offer is made or requested, there is a rejection of the
offer which puts an end to the negotiation,
unless the party who made the original
offer renews it or assents to the modi
fication suggested."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This general principle is supported by the case of
Burton v. Coombs, 557 P.2d 148 (Utah 1976), which was so
heavily relied upon by the defendants at trial.

In that

case, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to compel the
defendants to honor an acceptance of a settlement offer
which was communicated to the defendants prior to trial, but
which was rejected by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs claimed

that during the trial the offer was renewed and that the
plaintiffs were therefore entitled to accept the offer of
settlement and bind the defendants thereto.

The court held,

however, that there was no reinstatement of the offer by the
defendants, and therefore, there was nothing to be accepted
by the plaintiffs.

In so holding, the Supreme Court implied

that where there has been a reinstatement an offer after it
has been rejected, it is susceptible to acceptance.

The

court stated:
Plaintiffs, by their words and expressly
refusing the offer tendered at the beginning
of trial and by their conduct in proceeding
with litigation, effectively terminated the
rights and liability of the parties to the
proposed settlement.
It was impossible for
plaintiffs to assert acceptance at a later time
unless defendants had expressly renewed their
offer, and the record does not show that this
was done.
In the present case there was a firm and absolute renewal
of the counter-offer by the defendants on January 17, 1977,
and the plaintiffs accepted the counter-offer on January 18,
1977.
The five day period was not expressly mentioned in the
reinstatement of the counter-offer, but even if the five day
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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requirement was reinstated on the 17th with the renewal of
the offer, the plaintiffs, of course, accepted within the
five day period.
If the Court determines that the original counter-offer
of January 11th is the controlling offer, then the plaintiffs'
timely accepted in any event.
While the offer stated that it was "subject to buyers
acceptance within five days", it did not state when the five
day period commenced to run.

The question is "within five

days frbm what?"
While the counter-offer was signed and dated January
11, 1977, the five day period did not commence to run until
the counter-offer was actually received by the purchasers.
It is undisputed in the present case that the Norris' did
not have a counter-offer in their hands until January 12,
1977.

Since an offer is not considered made until it is

actually received by the offeree, 17 Am.Jur.2d 369, Contracts
§31, the condition that the purchaser accept "within five
days" had no meaning until the offer was received by the
Norrises.

In other words, the Norrises were entitled to

accept "within five days" after the offer was received by
them.
It is general rule that when an act is required to be
performed within a specified period of time, the rule is to
exclude the first day and to exclude Sunday's, if the period
of time is less than seven days.

These rules are generally

stated as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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Formerly, where a computation of time
was to be made from an act done or from the
time of an act, the day when the act was
done was to be included.
However, at the
present time, both in the construction of
contracts and statutes as well as in matters
of practice when time is to be computed from
a particular day or when an act is to be performed within a specified period from or
after a day named, the rule is to exclude
the first day and to include the last day
of the specified period, except when a certain number of the entire days are reCI,\!ired to
intervene, in which case both the first and
last days are excluded. In many jurisdictions, the rule excluding the first day
and including the last is incorporated in
statutes defining computation of time.
Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in computing periods of time prescribed by order
of court or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default after
which the designated period of time begins
to run is not to be included, but the last
day of the period so computed is to be included
unless it is Sunday or a legal holiday.
In
the absence of anything showing an intention
to count only "clear" or "entire" days, it
is generally held that in computing the time
for performance of an act or event which must
take place a certain number of days before a
known future day, one of the terminal days
is included in the count and the other is excluded.
However, a computation made by excluding both first and last days has frequently
been employed, either as a general rule in
some jurisdictions, or, in other jurisdictions,
where it appears that there was an intention
to county only "clear" or "entire" days.
In the absence of a controlling statutory
provision. which fixes an absolute rule of
computation, the courts will as a general rule
adopt that construction which will uphold and
enforce, rather than destroy, bona fide transactions and titles; whenever it is necessary
to prevent a forfeiture or to effectuate the
clear intention of the parties, the dies a quo
will be included.
Further, where it is provided that a certain result shall not accrue
until after the expiration of a given number
of days from a stated date, then both the
first and last days must be excluded, so that
the full number of days will be allowed.
74 Am.Jr.2d 597, Time §15.
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Where a limitation of time is fixed by
statute within which an act is required
to be performed, and the time stipulated
for performance does not exceed a week,
Sunday will be excluded in the computation of the time without an express
statutory requirement to that effect;
but when the time stipulated must necessarily include one or more Sundays,
those days will not be excluded, in the
absence of an express proviso for their
exclusion. This general principle is
held applicable to contracts, by a number of authorities, so that where an
act is required to be done in a certain
number of days exceeding a week, Sunday
is included in the computations; but
if the number of days is less than-?,
Sunday is not counted.
74 Am. Jur. 2d 603, Time

§

20.

This general rule is supported in Utah by statutes as
follows:
U.C.A. 68-3-7, Time, how computed.
The time in which any act provided by
law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the
last, unless the last is a holiday, and
then it is also excluded.
U.C.A. 63-13-2 Legal Holidays-Governor
Authorized to Declare Additional Days.

* * *

(2) For the period beginning with the
effective date of this act, [Feb. 6,
1970], the following-named days are
legal holidays in this state: every
Sunday * * *
In the present case, the only days that would be counted
would be January 13, 14, 15, 17, and 18.

Since the plaintiffs'

unqualified acceptance was communicated to the defendants on
January 18, they are entitled to specific performance of the
contract.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF, TAYLOR NATIONAL REAL RSTATE,

IS ENTITLED

TO A COMMISSION FOR FINDING A BUYER WHO WAS READY, WILLING
AND ABLE TO PURCHASE.

The common way for a seller to employ real estate
brokers to sell his property is to list the property with a
multiple listing service, thereby giving the seller the
benefit of the efforts of several brokers and agents.

The

relevant portions of the listing agreement currently used by
the Utah C?unty Board of Realtors, and the ones with which
we are concerned in the present case are as follows:
In consideration of your agreement to
list the property described herein and to use
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or
tenant therefor, I hereby grant you for the
period of six months from date hereof the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said
property or any part thereof, at the price
and terms stated hereon, or at such other price
or terms to which I may agree in writing.
During the life of this contract, if you find
a party who is ready, able and willing to buy,
lease or exchange said property or any part
thereof, at said price and terms, or any
other price or terms, to which I may agree
in writing, or if said property or any part
thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during
said term by myself or any other party, I
agree to pay you a commission of six percent
for such sale, lease or exchange. Should
said property be sold, leased or exchanged
within six months after such expiration to
any party to who the property was offered or
shown by me, or you, or any other party during
the terms of this listing, I agree to pay you
the commission above stated.

* * *
In case of the employment of an attorney to
enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and
all costs of collection.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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You are hereby authorizea ana instructea to
offer this property thru the Multiple Listing
Service of the Utah County Boara of Realtors.

* * *
The Courts of Utah have long recognized the general
rule that unaer a listing agreement which requires a real
estate broker to fina a buyer who is reaay, willing ana able
to buy, the broker is entitlea to a commission when he finas
such a buyer, even if the transaction is not actually consummated.
Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954);
Garff Realty Co. v. Better Builaings, Inc., 120 Utah 344,
234 P.2a 842 (1951); Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137,
256 P.2a 238 (1953); Ogden Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Blakely,
66 Utah 229, 241 P.221 (1925); Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah
549, 155 P.432 (1916).
In Curtis v. Mortensen, supra, the plaintiff real
estate broker securea a six month listing agreement from the
defenaant seller which proviaea that if a buyer was founa
who was ready, willing and able to buy the property, a
commission woula be paid.

A purchaser was found within the

six month period and an earnest money agreement was signea
by the salesman as agent for the buyers and was signed by

the sellers.

Thereafter, the sellers rescindea the earnest

money agreement and attemptea to rescind the listing agreement.
The sellers refusea to sell to the potential buyers ana the
deal collapsea.

The broker brou~ht an action to recover his

commission under the listing agreement.

The broker appealed

from a trial court aecision aaverse to him and the Supreme
Sponsored
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The sale was never consummated because
respondents changed their minds and refused
to sell and not because the buyers refused
to make a binding agreement.
Under such
circumstances appellants have fulfilled
their part of the listing agreement by
having produced purchasers who were ready,
willing and able to buy the listed property
and are entitled to their commission.
Such were the terms of the listing agreement
made by the parties. There was no requirement that a binding contract be entered into
and for us to add that requirement would be
to make a new contract for them. This we
may not do. As stated in 8 Am. Jur. Sec.
184, page 1097:
"Once the broker has procured a
person who is able, ready and
willing to purchase on the terms
offered by the owner, he is entitled
to commission, even though the
failure to complete the contract
is due to the default or refusal
of the employer."
This court in Little and Little v.
Fleishman, 35 Utah 566, on page 568, 101
P. 984, on page 984, 24 L.R.A., N.S.,
1182, indicated it was in accord with
the above statement, even though it was
unnecessary to a decision of that case
since a binding offer had been obtained
by the owner, by saying:

"* * * The substantial features of the
agreement between plaintiffs and the
defendant are that the plaintiffs were
employed to effect, not consummate, a
sale, and were entitled to a commission
in the event of a sale at any price agreed
upon. When the plaintiff obtained and
produced a purchaser who was able, ready
and willing to purchase for the price, and
on the terms proposed they did all that
was required to them, and the owner
could not, under the terms of his contract
with them, arbitrarily refuse to sell
and decline to enter into negotations of
a sale with the proposed purchaser without
becoming liable to plaintiffs for their
commission.
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See also Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Utah, 261,
P.2d 927, Down v. DeGroot, 83 Cal, App.
115, 256 P.438 and Peeler v. Bean, Tex.
Civ. App., 38 S.W. 2d 395.
In a similar factual setting, the Court in Garff Realty Co.
v. Better Buildings Inc., supra, at 843, held that where a
real estate broker procured the signature of a purchaser on
an earnest money receipt and agreement for purchase, there
was legal consideration for the promise of the vendor to pay
a commission to the broker and the broker was-entitled to
recover the commission.
There are a host of cases in which it has been recognized
that the right to compensation on the part of a real estate
broker employed to effect a sale of property who has produced
a person ready, able and willing to purchase the property
upon the terms stipulated inthe brokerage listing agreement,
it not lost by a failure of completion of the transaction,
where such failure is due to the refusal of the seller to go
through with the sale.

Curtis v. Mortensen, supra, 169

A.L.R. 605: Right of Real-Estate Broker, Employed to Effect
or Consummate Sale, to Compensation Where Principal Refuses
or is Unable to Complete Transaction; 12 Am. Jur. 2d 922,
Brokers §183 and cases cited therein.
This Court has recognized that where a broker, employed
to effect the sale of real estate, obtains a written earnest
money agreement containing the terms of sale as agreed upon
in the listing agreement signed by a prospective purchaser
Who is ready, able and willing to perform upon the terms
agreed upon, the contract on the part of the broker is
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the owner's refusal to go through with the transaction.

In

Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927 (1953), a
broker obtained the signature of a purchaser on the usual
printed form Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement which
recited the terms of sale contained in the listing agreement,
with the agreed down payment.

After a series of negotiations,

the sellers refused to sell to the prospective buyers on the
terms of the listing agreement.

Thereafter, the sellers

brought an action against the broker to recover money which
he had kept as commission for arranging the sale.

The

Court, on an appeal by the defendant-broker from a judgment
adverse to him in the trial court, held that the broker was
entitled to his commission.
[2] That agreement certainly contemplated that the plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward the accomplishment
of the purpose for which he employed defendant.
He cannot be permitted to procure them to
obtain a buyer, on terms accepted by the
plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplishment of what he requested and authorized them
to do by arbitrarily refusing to perform his
part of the transaction.
Under such circumstances, he will not be heard to complain of
their failure to do that which he prevented.
(Citing cases and 169 A.L.R. 605).
Hoyt
v. Wasatch Homes, supra, at 930.
-And in the recent case of Davis v. Health Development

Com~

558 P.2d 594 (Utah, 1976) the Court reaffirmed this rule by
saying:
Plaintiff Davis's Claim of Commission
[5] Plaintiff Davis makes the argument
that the plan submitted for obtaining financing and the purchase by Mrs. Housely and
Mrs. Brinton fulfilled his obligation under
the listing contract to obtain a ready, willing
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and able buyer, wherefore, he should be entitled
to his commission.
He supports this argument
if an agent so performs, and the sale is not
completed because of lack of cooperation or
obstruction by the listor (the defendant corporation), the agent is nevertheless entitled
to his commission.
Plaintiffs submit that the cases of Curtis, Hoyt, and
Davis clearly state the rule that a real estate broker is
entitled to commission, regardless of the enforceability of
any agreement between the vendor and the purchaser, if the
broker produces a ready, willing and able buyer who is
prevented from purchasing by an act of the vendor.
In the present case, it was the erroneous conclusion by
Mr. Anderson that the time for acceptance had expired,
coupled with the offer by Mr. Boley to purchase the property
that caused the Andersons to refuse to consummate the deal.
In fact, when the Norrises met with Anderson on the 19th of
January, he told them that if they had accepted the offer
within five days they would have bought the place. (T. 24).
Clearly the refusal to sell was the decision of the Andersons,
Hall, and Boley and not the Norrises.

The plaintiff, Taylor

National Real Estate, is consequently entitled to a commission

of six percent (6%) on the proposed purchase price of $250,000.00.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs, LKL Associates, timely accepted the
renewal of the defendants' offer, thereby entitling them to
specific performance.

It was the miscalculation of the

Andersons and the advice and offer of Boley Realty that
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prevented the sale from culminating.

The plaintiff should

not be prevented from a legitimate purchase by the actions
of the sellers and their realtor.

For these same reasons,

the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate is entitled to
its duly earned commission.
Respectfully submitted this
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